BEGIN THE TRUMP RESISTANCE PLAN BEFORE IT’S TOO LATE

[This article fist appeared on billmoyers.com on January 9, 2017]

Note from Bill Moyers:  I’m pleased to officially welcome Steven Harper to our site. Steven retired early from a successful career as a litigator to write – and write he has done, including two acclaimed books — The Lawyer Bubble — A Profession in Crisis and Crossing Hoffa – A Teamster’s Story (a Chicago Tribune “Best Book of the Year”). He’s currently working on another, from which I’ve read some riveting excerpts, about the recent downfall of a New York law firm once led by New York State Governor and two-time presidential candidate Thomas Dewey. 

Steven Harper blogs at his site The Belly of the Beast (https://thelawyerbubble.com/), contributes regularly to the monthly magazine The American Lawyer, and is an adjunct professor at Northwestern University. When I read one of his short essays recently and some of his work on his current book project, I invited him to contribute a series of articles providing insights into current events. You can follow him here on our site and on Twitter at @StevenJHarper1. 

 

“Begin The Trump Resistance Plan Before It’s Too Late”

“Immediate necessity makes many things convenient, which if continued would grow into oppression…” 

— Thomas Paine, Common Sense (1776)

Ordinary citizens searching for the convenient satisfaction of immediate necessity are Donald Trump’s unwitting allies in an unseen war on democracy. It’s difficult to blame them. Most Americans are busy leading frenetic lives. In sound bites, they receive what passes for news; there’s no time to confirm its veracity. Politicians like Trump tell them what they want to hear; it pleases them. But quick solutions displace efforts to understand complicated challenges for which there are no easy answers.

Short-term convenience can produce long-run peril. Waiting for Trump’s America to reveal itself assures his victory and the republic’s loss. Perhaps more precisely, it could assure the loss of the republic. Successfully resisting the dangerous Donald Trump requires united action toward a common goal, thoughtful strategy, and flexible tactics.

The Goal

The objective of The Trump Resistance Plan (TRP) must transcend America’s politics and culture wars. Citizens of good will across the political spectrum will always disagree on matters of public concern. That’s healthy democracy.

The larger battle at hand pits democracy against an unknown fate. Throughout the world, populist nationalism is joining with authoritarian leaders to upend longstanding democracies. To repel this historic assault on our shores, the TRP proposes a goal that should find universal acceptance among Republicans, Democrats and independents.

For 230 years, two norms have anchored American democracy. One is that elections must be free of foreign interference. Another is that the presidency must be free of institutionalized corruption. Trump is undermining both. The TRP’s single goal is to preserve those norms.

The importance of the first is clear. America sought independence from the tyranny of remote rule. Foreign agents that subvert our most important democratic process – voting – are enemies. Any citizen giving aid or comfort commits treason. Trump’s belittling of U.S. intelligence conclusions that Russia hacked the election to help him win seems to qualify.

The second norm distinguishes the United States from countries where tyrants increase personal wealth and power at the expense of the people. That principle, too, has roots in the founding of our nation as a rebellion against a king and his corrupt government. Even the appearance that presidential acts are for sale is incompatible with democracy. Trump’s refusal to release his tax returns, liquidate his business holdings, and relinquish his finances to a truly independent blind trust violates that norm.

The Audience

No patriot can reasonably resist the TRP’s goal. After all, it’s not tit-for-tat politics designed to exact revenge for Republican recalcitrance during President Obama’s eight years, although some might prefer that myopic mission. Policy outcomes are important. But the current stakes are greater than the ebb and flow of typical political battles.

To succeed in eradicating two norms that underpin American democracy, Trump requires a compliant Republican Congress. Many GOP members opposed Donald Trump’s candidacy. They knew he lacked the experience and temperament to govern. Rationalizing that anything – even an erratic, irrational, and self-aggrandizing Trump – was better than Hillary Clinton, almost all of those detractors succumbed to his bullying and fell in line.

Now some of those same Republicans have learned that they were actually falling in line with Vladimir Putin. That alone should create a case of buyer’s remorse. But Trump can offer them a deal. They get his support for the hard-right policies that many Republicans have wanted for years. In return, all they have to give him is what he wants: fracturing the two central norms of American democracy. Perhaps some of them now realize that they are playing out a script for which only Putin, Trump and his minions know the ending.

Senator Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) doesn’t care. He wants Trump’s deal. Sorting out conflicts of interest for members of what will become the wealthiest cabinet in modern history is a big job. The absence of a thorough Trump transition team vetting process makes it even bigger than usual. But McConnell is working with Team Trump to give the Office of Government Ethics – and the American people – the bum’s rush.

The Challenge

Putin’s stain on Trump’s election is permanent. Everything that he does as president comes with a taint. Everything. Likewise, his failure to eliminate his conflicts of interest means that every presidential act brings with it a presumption of corruption. Any member of Congress who supports legislation that he signs on any subject gets dragged deeper into his mud.

The two norms he seeks to destroy are threshold issues for the moral authority of his office. Whether his actions take the form of appointments, signing legislation, or issuing executive orders does not matter. All are fruit of a poisonous Trump election tree. Whether the subject is health care, tax reform, trade or anything else, the stench of election scandal and a presumption of corrupting financial conflicts of interest hang over everything he touches.

Surely a handful of Republican Senators can find sufficient strength to become profiles in courage. It takes only three heroes to flip his 52-48 margin in the Senate into a bulwark that protects liberty from his assault. Then he’d have to deal with those representing the majority of voters who wanted someone else in the Oval Office. That won’t eliminate his Putin election cloud or the taint of his presumed self-dealing, but it’s a start.

The Stakes

Shortly after the election, The New York Times’ editorial board wrote that it was “ready to support” Trump, “without denying the many disgraceful things he did and said to get elected, the promises he may or may not keep, the falsehoods he peddled that were either delusions or lies.”

Such compartmentalization is treacherous. Character is destiny. The country cannot allow Donald Trump’s character to determine its destiny. In his battle to obliterate the two norms without which democracy cannot exist, every conscientious citizen should force him and his minions to fight for every inch of ground.

No shot has been fired, but make no mistake: the war for America began on November 8.

Turn off your reality-TV shows, folks; this is real.

A FOOL FOR A CLIENT

Abraham Lincoln often gets credit for the line, but in 1814 clergyman Henry Kett’s collection of proverbs in The Flowers of Wit included, “I hesitate not to pronounce that every man who is his own lawyer has a fool for client.”

More than two centuries later, it’s still true. But don’t tell Stephen DiCarmine, former executive director of the now-defunct Dewey & LeBoeuf. He doesn’t believe it. Recently, he appeared before Acting Justice Robert Stolz and explained that he wants to fire his attorney and represent himself.

Last year, three weeks of deliberation following a three-month trial produced a defense verdict on some counts and a deadlocked jury on the remaining charges against DiCarmine, former firm chairman Steven Davis, and former chief financial officer Joel Sanders. Davis then entered into a deferred prosecution agreement and Justice Stolz dismissed additional counts. Retrial on the remaining charges against DiCarmine and Sanders is set for September.

Judicial Skepticism

“The consequences are very severe in this case,” Justice Stolz told DiCarmine. “You could go to state prison if convicted.”

DiCarmine thinks he knows better. A graduate of California Western School of Law in 1983, he told the judge that he had discussed the issue with several lawyer friends. Their reactions: “Bad idea.”

But DiCarmine heard what he wanted to hear. At least, that’s what he told the judge: “They said if anyone can do it, you can do it.”

The truth is that when incarceration is a potential outcome, no one can do it. And no one should try. Gideon v. Wainwright’s guarantee of a right to counsel in criminal cases exists for a reason. And it doesn’t matter if the defendant is a lawyer.

Justice Stolz warned DiCarmine that he might think he knows what the case is all about because he’s been through it once. “But I assure you,” he urged, “it will be a different jury. It will be a different presentation from the People.”

An Unfortunate Moment

DiCarmine’s current lawyer, Austin Campriello, did a masterful job at the first trial. For good reason, he’s among the most highly respected criminal defense lawyers in New York. Campriello told the court that although his client’s finances were a factor, the motivating reason for DiCarmine’s request related to defense strategy.

DiCarmine then offered an unfortunate comment that unfairly tarred other big firms.

“I’ve run a law firm,” DiCarmine said. “When the client is not paying the bill, the services that are being rendered are not necessarily the same as if he were being paid.”

Nonsense. He displayed a remarkable ignorance of what the lawyers in his firm were actually doing while he was “running” it. Directly, he insulted all former Dewey & LeBoeuf attorneys who worked on pro bono matters. Indirectly, he put a cloud over the noble efforts of big firm lawyers who provide millions of dollars in free legal services to clients every year. Implicit in his remarks are widespread violations of ethical rules to advocate on behalf of all clients with the same seal. Those rules apply to all lawyers.

Natural Consequences

Justice Stolz properly put DiCarmine in his place, saying that Campriello would work to the best of his professional capacity, regardless of DiCarmine’s financial situation. He also told DiCarmine to think long and hard about his pro se request before the next hearing on May 27.

DiCarmine seeks to jettison a great lawyer for someone who, apparently, has been in a courtroom only as a witness or a defendant — that is, himself. It reminds me of the joke that one of my mentors told about the importance of using experienced trial lawyers in important cases.

“A patient goes to a doctor with a serious medical condition for which there is an elaborate surgical cure,” the joke begins. “The doctor describes in great detail how the procedure will go — start to finish. The patient is impressed, but has one more question: ‘How many of these operations have you performed?’ the patient asks. ‘Oh, none,’ says the doctor, ‘But I’ve watch a lot of them.'”

Revise the scenario slightly so that the doctor has observed the procedure only once — and is going to perform it on himself. Now you have a sense of DiCarmine’s plan.

THE LATEST BIG LAW FIRM STRATEGY: PERFECTING ERROR

NOTE: Amazon is running a promotion. The KINDLE version of my novel, The Partnership, is available as a free download from March 30 through April 3, 2016.

Two months ago in “Big Law Leaders Perpetuating Mistakes,” I outlined evidence of failure that most big law firm leaders ignore. Back in December 2011, I’d covered the topic in “Fed to Death” The recently released trade paperback version of my latest book, The Lawyer Bubble – A Profession in Crisis, includes an extensive new afterword that begins, “The more things change…”

The failure is a ubiquitous strategy: aggressive inorganic growth. In response to facts and data, big law firm leaders aren’t stepping back to take a long, hard look at the wisdom of the approach. Instead, they’re tinkering at the margins in the desperate attempt to turn a loser into a winner. To help them, outside consultants — perennial enablers of big law firms’ worst impulses — have developed reassuring and superficially appealing metrics. For anyone who forgot, numbers are the answer to everything.

Broken Promises

One measure of failure is empirical. Financially, many lateral partners aren’t delivering on their promises to bring big client billings with them. Even self-reporting managing partners admit that only about half of their lateral hires are above breakeven (however they measure it), and the percentage has been dropping steadily. In “How to Hire a Home-Run Lateral? Look at Their Stats,” MP McQueen of The American Lawyer writes that the “fix” is underway: more than 20 percent of Am Law 200 firms are now using techniques made famous by the book and movie “Moneyball.”

“Using performance-oriented data, firms try to create profiles of the types of lawyers they need to hire to help boost profits, then search for candidates who fit the profile,” McQueen reports. “They may also use the tools to estimate whether a certain candidate would help the firm’s bottom line.”

There’s an old computer programmer’s maxim: “Garbage in, garbage out.”

Useless Data

Unlike baseball’s immutable data about hits, runs, strikeouts, walks, and errors, assessing attorney talent is far more complicated and far less objective. Ask a prospective lateral partner about his or her billings. Those expecting an honest answer deserve what they get. Ask the partner whether billings actually reflect clients and work that will make the move to a new firm. Even the partner doesn’t know the answer to that one.

Group Dewey Consulting’s Eric Dewey, who is appropriately skeptical about using prescriptive analytics in this process, notes, “An attorney needs to bring roughly 70 percent of their book of business with them within 12 months just to break even.” He also observes that more than one-third bring with them less than 50 percent.

Of course, there’s nothing wrong with assessing the likely value that a strategically targeted lateral hire might bring to the firm. And there’s nothing wrong with using data to inform decisions. But that’s different from using flawed numerical results to justify growth for the sake of growth.

Becoming What You Eat

Beyond the numbers is an even more important reality. Partners who might contribute to a firm’s short-term bottom line may have a more important long-term cultural impact. It might even be devastating.

Dewey & LeBoeuf — no relation to Group Dewey Consulting — learned that lesson the hard way. During the years prior to its collapse, the firm hired dozens of lateral rainmakers. But as the firm was coming apart in early 2012, chairman Steven H. Davis was wasting his breath when he told fellow partners there wasn’t enough cash to pay all of them everything they thought they deserved: “I have the sense that we have lost our focus on our culture and what it means to be a Dewey & LeBoeuf partner.”

Half of the partners he was addressing had been lateral hires over the previous five years. Most of them had joined the firm because it promised them more money. They hadn’t lost their focus on culture. They had redefined it.

BIG LAW LEADERS PERPETUATING MISTAKES

In January 2014, the annual Georgetown/Peer Monitor “Report on the State of the Legal Market” urged law firm leaders to shun a “growth for growth’s sake” strategy. The year 2013 had been a record-setter in law firm mergers; lateral partner acquisitions were the centerpiece of what many big law firm leaders passed off as a “strategic plan.”

The Report offered this damning observation:

“In our view, much of the growth that has characterized the legal market in recent years… masks a bigger problem — the continuing failure of most firms to focus on strategic issues that are more important for their long-term success than the number of lawyers or offices they may have.”

Since then, the situation has deteriorated.

The Destabilizing Lateral Hiring Frenzy Continues

In 2015, there were more lateral moves in big law firms than at any time since 2009. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius’s mass hiring of 300 former Bingham Mccutcheon partners contributed significantly to the total, but the continuing lateral frenzy is evident. Was the 2014 Georgetown/Peer Monitor wrong? Has aggressive inorganic growth become a winning strategy?

The answers are No and No.

Those answers are not news, but a recent ALM Legal Intelligence analysis suggests that they still are correct. As MP McQueen reports in the February issue of The American Lawyer, “[The] study of 50 National Law Journal 350 firms conducted with Group Dewey Consulting of Davis, California, and released in November found that 30 percent of lateral partner hires delivered less than half their promised book of business after a complete year.”

The co-author of the report notes that lateral hiring is “the top growth strategy for many firms today but there is an incredible lack of empirical evidence as to whether laterals are achieving their promise.”

It’s actually worse than that. The evidence suggests that most lateral hires are disappointments to the firms that acquire them.

Cognitive Dissonance

The survey reported that 96 percent of respondents said that “hiring lateral lawyers with a client following” was “very important” or “moderately important” to their revenue growth strategy. In other words, virtually all firms continue to defy the Georgetown/Peer Monitor Report’s 2014 admonition.

But the survey respondents also said that only 49 percent of lateral hires delivered at least 75 percent of expected client billings. The other 50 percent did worse. Almost one-third of laterals delivered less than half of what they’d promised. And remember, those are anonymous, unaudited responses from the leaders who brought those laterals into the firm. The reality is far worse than they admit.

Likewise, as I’ve written previously, managing partners responding to the Hildebrandt/Citi 2015 Client Advisory’s confidential survey admitted that only about half of their lateral partners were break-even at best. As the Client Advisory reported:

“For all the popularity of growth through laterals, the success rate of a firm’s lateral strategy can be quite low. For the past few years, we have asked leaders of large firms to quantify the rate of success of the laterals they hired over the past five years. Each year, the proportion of laterals who they would describe as being above ‘break even’, by their own definition, has fallen. In 2014, the number was just 54 percent of laterals who had joined their firms during 2009-2013.” (Emphasis supplied)

That’s down from two years ago when managing partners self-reported to Citi/Hildebrandt a self-defined break-even or better rate of 60 percent.  At alarming speed, most big law leaders are running their firms backwards.

Costly Mistakes

The cultural impact of aggressive inorganic growth is not susceptible to measurement, so it gets ignored in the prevailing law-firm-as-a-business model. But there are plenty of recent examples of the potentially catastrophic costs. Just look at Howrey, Dewey, and Bingham McCutchen — three recent collapses on the heels of stunning lateral growth spurts.

“Nonsense,” big law leaders are telling themselves. “We’re not like those failed firms. They had unique problems. We’re special.” Sure you are. Things look great until it becomes apparent only too late that current partner profits are the only glue holding partners together. If money lured laterals into your firm, someone else’s more reliable money can lure them away.

But even in the not-so-long run, top-line growth through misguided lateral hiring produces bottom-line shrinkage. Laterals are expensive on the front end. On the back end, it can take years for the failure of financial expectations to become apparent. The ALI study estimates that lateral hiring misfires can reduce law firm profit margins by as much as 3 percent and profits per equity partner by 6 percent.

Why?

If lateral hiring is bad, why are so many firms committed to it as a growth strategy. One answer is that it’s not always bad. Some of my best friends are laterals. Their moves benefitted them and their new firms. In every one of those cases, culture was at least as important as money to the partners’ decisions to relocate and their new firms’ desire to recruit them.

But that doesn’t account for firms that continue to pursue aggressive inorganic growth as an unrestrained strategic policy. When the odds of success are no greater than the flip of a coin, confirmation bias displaces judgment that should be a key attribute of true leadership.

That leads to another explanation for the continuing lateral hiring frenzy: The opposite of leadership. Most managing partners relish the creation of ever-expanding empires over which they can preside. Having made more than enough money to feed their families for generations, now they’re feeding their egos.

Unfortunately, those appetites can be insatiable.

DEWEY, THE D.A., AND SECRETS

“There aren’t too many secrets in this case,” said Judge Robert Stoltz on December 5. He was referring to the Dewey & LeBoeuf trial over which he presided. The multi-year effort to convict Steven Davis, Stephen DiCarmine, and Joel Sanders produced a raft of acquittals on many charges and a hung jury on the more serious offenses.

Actually, there are two big secrets in the case, but no one is talking about them.

Secret #1: Why Zachary Warren?

Former Dewey chairman Steven H. Davis won’t face a retrial. Assistant DA Peirce Moser has offered him a deferred prosecution agreement. As reported, he will not have to admit guilt and can continue practicing law. When my kids were young, they would have called this a “do-over.”

Judge Stoltz’s reference to secrets was in response to Moser’s suggestion that the retrial of executive director DiCarmine and finance director Sanders should precede the first trial of former low-level staffer Zachary Warren. The longer Warren dangled in a world of uncertainty, the more leverage it would give Moser in his relentless pursuit of someone who never should have been indicted in the first place. Appropriately, the judge denied Moser’s request.

That leads to secret number one: Why is the Manhattan DA’s office squandering its scarce resources to pursue Zachary Warren at all?

I’ve written extensively about Warren’s plight. At age 24, he worked at Dewey & LeBoeuf for about a year from mid-2008 to mid-2009 as a client relations specialist. His principal job was to pester Dewey & LeBoeuf partners into making sure clients paid their bills.

Apparently, his mistake of a lifetime came on December 30, 2008. That’s when he accepted an invitation to join 29-year-old finance director Frank Canellas and 53-year-old chief financial officer Sanders for dinner at Del Frisco’s steakhouse. There he allegedly witnessed the creation of what the DA’s office called a master plan of accounting fraud. As his price for that free dinner, Warren would get indicted five years later.

When Zachary Warren left Dewey & LeBoeuf in June 2009, did anyone in the world think that the firm was unlikely to repay its bills, much less collapse — ever? No.

In 2010, was Warren even at the firm as others worked on the bond offering at the center of the DA’s case? No, he was a one-L at Georgetown.

Even if obtained, would a conviction of Warren result in anything positive for anyone inside or outside our justice system? No.

Warren’s indictment was a travesty. The jury’s rejection of the DA’s case against his superiors is reason alone to drop the effort to prosecute him.

Unsatisfying Answers

So why is Moser so determined to try Zach Warren? One possibility is that the same phenomena contributing to Dewey & LeBoeuf’s downfall infects the DA’s office: hubris, ego, lack of accountability for mistakes, and an unwillingness to admit errors that would prompt thoughtful individuals to change course. Maybe it’s a lawyer personality thing.

Another possibility is the public servant manifestation of greed: the DA wants to put a Dewey & Le Boeuf notch — any Dewey & LeBoeuf notch — on its convictions holster. After Cyrus Vance, Jr. personally announced the indictments in a circus-like press conference on March 6, 2014, Moser suffered unambiguous defeat. In fact, even the plea agreements that the DA’s office squeezed from former firm staffers who later testified at trial now look silly. Unfortunately, the resulting penalties aren’t silly for those who are stuck with them.

To put the DA’s pursuit of Zachary Warren in context consider this. According to published reports, assistant DA Peirce Moser has offered him a plea deal, too. But it is more onerous than the DA’s deferred prosecution agreement with Davis.

There is no just world in which that makes any sense.

Secret #2: Where is the Money?

Prosecutors told the jury that it would not see a “smoking gun.” That’s because the DA didn’t know how to look for or describe it. But the gun was there. It was pervasive, insidious, and hiding in plain sight. It was the environment that caused staffers to fear for their jobs if powerful partners weren’t happy. That meant making sure they received millions more than the firm had available to distribute, even if it came from bank credit lines and outside investors in the firm’s 2010 bond offering.

That leads to secret number two: Why didn’t the DA follow the money?

The public could have reasonably expected Vance to direct the power of his office toward the most egregious offenders and offenses. That didn’t happen. Sure, Davis had a major responsibility for the strategy that brought the firm down. But the executive committee consisted of top partners who were supposed to be fiduciaries in running the firm for the benefit of all partners and the institution. Likewise, as most of the firm’s so-called leaders walked away with millions — far more than Davis, DiCarimine, Sanders, or Warren received — bankruptcy creditors got between five and fifteen cents for every dollar the firm owed them.

In a November 2012 bankruptcy court filing, Davis himself teed up what should have been the central issue in any attempt to assign blame for the firm’s problems:

“While ‘greed’ is a theme…, the litigation that eventually ensues will address the question of whose greed.”

The DA’s office never pursued that question.

Just Rewards

Shortly after Vance’s March 2014 press conference, assistant district attorney Peirce Moser received a promotion. He became chief of the tax crimes unit. The DA’s office announced that Moser’s new position would not preclude him from continuing to run the Dewey & LeBoeuf case. Based on his prominence at the most recent court hearing, it’s still Moser’s case.

If no good deed goes unpunished, sometimes it seems that no bad deed goes unrewarded.

BASEBALL AND BIG LAW

Watching the Chicago Cubs make their way into the National League Championship Series causes me to reflect on one of my favorite themes: baseball as a metaphor for life. It might have something to tell big law firms, too.

I focus on the Chicago Cubs because I’ve watched the team since the season began. Before giving up on them several years ago, I was a fan for three decades that started with the birth of our first child in 1981. He and his siblings qualify as long-suffering lifetime fans. For many years, we had season tickets.

As an adult, I knew little of Cubs’ fan angst because I grew up in Minneapolis — an American League city where some of the best entertainment was watching then-Twins coach Billy Martin get thrown out of games during the team’s 1965 pennant run. (Famously, Sandy Koufax refused to pitch in game one of that World Series because it fell on Yom Kippur.  He then won games five and seven — pitching complete game shutouts in both.)

After years of Cubs’ frustration, what’s working now? That’s where parallels to big law emerge.

Talent

The Cubs have stars on their roster. Jake Arrieta, Jon Lester, Anthony Rizzo, Addison Russell, and Kris Bryant have become household names in Chicago and beyond. As in a law firm, talent is a necessary condition for success.

But talent alone is not sufficient. Just ask former partners of Dewey & LeBoeuf — a firm loaded with talent.

Depth

When shortstop Addison Russell went down with a pulled hamstring in game three of the National League Division Series, Cubs fans gasped. But the team didn’t fold. Javier Baez was ready to take the field. In game four of the series, Baez hit a three-run homer that turned the tide in the Cubs’ favor.

At shortstop — and every other position — the Cubs have a backup plan. According to Altman Weil’s 2015 Report, “Law Firms In Transition,” only 31 percent of law firms have a formal succession planning process in place.

Most big law firm partners resist transition because it vests younger attorneys with the power to claim a share of client billings. Likewise, most firms offer no financial incentive for partners to mentor young attorneys. There’s no way to bill that time.

Attitude

From July through September and into early October, Cubs ace pitcher Jake Arrieta seemed unstoppable. Then he gave up four runs in the fist five innings of League Division Series game 3. Relief pitchers stepped in and Cubs hitters stepped up. The Cubs won 8-6.

In post-game interviews following game four, the latest Cubs phenomenon, Kyle Schwarber, echoed what many other players said: “We pick each other up. When one guys is off, others step up. We have each other’s back.”

At many big firms, some partners seem determined to put sharp objects into the backs of their fellow partners.

Leadership

Cubs manager Joe Maddon doesn’t offer brash, self-aggrandizing remarks. He leads by quiet example. He expects players to do their best on the field, but he encourages balance in their lives. To emphasize his point, sometimes he cancels batting practice, especially if the team is in a hitting slump. He wants them thinking about other things.

Sometimes, he locks the clubhouse door until two or three hours before game time. Don’t show up early; you won’t have anything to do when you get there. Maddon wants them to develop lives beyond the field. Imagine a big law partner telling associates to go home at five or six o’clock — and not bill any time after they get there.

Maddon models behavior aimed at achieving balance. Before the season began, he took a dozen players to visit children at the Rehabilitation Institute of Chicago. Throughout the year, Anthony Rizzo, a cancer survivor, made similar trips to hospitals. So did Chris Coghlan and many of his teammates.

Culture

Maddon loves the game. He wants everyone around him to love it, too. He keeps the team loose. Sometimes he manages the team like a little league coach, moving players into different positions. Schwarber was behind the plate one game and in the outfield the next; Coghlan played five different positions in a single game; Bryant played four.

Humor is one of Maddon’s principal weapons. At the end of September, he brought exotic animals into the clubhouse. During the pregame media session, he talked to a flamingo named Warren.

“When is the last time you heard about 20-somethings who couldn’t wait to get to work?” Cubs President Theo Epstein asked one interviewer after the game that propelled the Cubs into the League Championship Series.

Perhaps most importantly, Maddon wants players to remember why they chose baseball as a career. Then they’ll realize that they should be enjoying themselves. Many lawyers could benefit from similar introspection.

On a personal note, I thoroughly enjoyed practicing law. But I’m sure glad that I spent time coaching all of my kids’ baseball and softball teams — more than 25 in all. Good luck to any young big law attorney who tries to replicate that feat today. Make the effort. It’s worth it.

DEWEY: 10 LESSONS LOST

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National news organizations began working on stories about the verdicts in the Dewey & LeBoeuf case long before the jury’s deliberations ended.

“What are the lessons?” several reporters asked me.

My initial inclination was to state the obvious: Until the jury renders its decision, who can say? But that would be an unfortunately limited way of viewing the tragedy that befell a once noble law firm. In fact, the trial obscured the most important lessons to be learned from the collapse of Dewey & LeBoeuf.

Lesson #1: You Are What You Eat

During the twelve months prior to the firms’ October 2007 merger, Dewey Ballantine hired 30 lateral partners; LeBoeuf Lamb hired 19. The combined firm continued that trend as Dewey & LeBoeuf became one of the top 10 firms in lateral recruiting. By 2011, 50 percent of the firm’s partners were post-2005 laterals into Dewey & LeBoeuf or its predecessors.

A partnership of relative strangers is not well-positioned to withstand adversity.

Lesson #2: Mind the Gap

To accomplish aggressive lateral hiring often means overpaying for talent and offering multi-year compensation promises. By 2012, Dewey & LeBoeuf’s ratio of highest-to-lowest paid equity partners was 20-to-1.

A lopsided, eat-what-you-kill partnership of haves and have-nots has difficulty adhering to a common mission.

Lesson #3: Not All Partners Are Partners

One corollary to a vast income gap within the equity ranks is the resulting partnership-within-a-partnership. As those at the top focus on the short-term interests of a select few, the long-run health of the institution suffers.

A partnership within a partnership can be a dangerous management structure.

Lesson #4: The Perils of Confirmation Bias

Firm leaders and their fellow partners are vulnerable to the same psychological tendencies that afflict us all. When former Dewey chairman Steven H. Davis held fast to his perennial view that better times were just around the corner, fellow partners wanted to believe him.

Magical thinking is not a business strategy.

Lesson #5: Short-termism Can Be Lethal

Short-term thinking dominates our society, even for people who view themselves as long-term strategists. At Dewey, the need to maximize current year partner profits and distribute cash to some partners overwhelmed any long-term vision that Davis sought to pursue.

In the not-so-long run, a firm can die.

Lesson #6: Behavior Follows Incentive Structures

Most firms hire lateral partners because they will add clients and billings. To prove their worth, laterals build client silos to prevent others from developing relationships with “their clients.” Similarly, there’s no incentive for partners in “eat-what-you-kill” firms to mentor young attorneys or facilitate the smooth intergenerational transition of client relationships.

Over time, the whole can become far less than the sum of its parts.

Lesson #7: Disaster Is Closer Than You Think

When the central feature of a firm’s culture is ever-increasing partner profits, even small dips become magnified. Incomes that are staggering to ordinary workers become insufficient to keep restless partners from finding a new place to work.

Death spirals accelerate.

Lesson #8: Underlings Beware

On cross-examination, some of the prosecution’s witnesses testified that at the time they made various accounting adjustments to Dewey’s books, they didn’t think they’d done anything wrong. But now they are parties to plea agreements that could produce prison time.

Deciding that something isn’t wrong is not always the same as determining that it’s right.

Lesson #9: Greed Governs

Who among the Dewey partners received the $150 million in bond proceeds from the firm’s 2010 bond offering? I posed that question a year ago and we still don’t know the answer. During the first five months of 2012 — as the firm was in its death throes — a small group of 25 partners received $21 million while the firm drew down its bank credit lines. Who masterminded that strategy?

In a November 2012 filing with the Dewey bankruptcy court, Steven Davis explained why Dewey collapsed: “While ‘greed’ is a theme…, the litigation that eventually ensues will address the question of whose greed.” (Docket #654) He was referring to some of his former partners who ignored the role that fortuity had played in creating their personal wealth.

Hubris is a powerfully destructive force.

Lesson #10: Superficial Differences Don’t Change Outcomes

For the three years that Dewey has been in the news, many big law firm leaders have been performing the task at which attorneys excel: distinguishing adverse precedent. In great detail, they explain all of the ways that their firms are nothing like Dewey. But they fail to consider the more significant ways in which their firms are similar.

A walk past the graveyard is easier when you whistle. Louder is better. Extremely loud and running is best.