THE JOURNEY BEGINS

After grounding me, my primary care physician (“PCP”) explained that my next trip anywhere would be to a hospital emergency room. I called my wife, Kit, to let her know what was happening and that I would be waiting near our front door where she should pick me up and drive to the ER. As she arrived, I received another call from my PCP, telling me that the sugar level in my blood was highly elevated, but he wasn’t sure how that related to my likely internal bleeding.

My wife knew the answer to that one. “Pancreas,” she said when I relayed the information to her in the car. It would be another two weeks before any doctor made the connection.

As I relate my story, I won’t name any individuals involved in my care. That’s because every medical person whom I encountered has been caring and conscientious. They are truly trying to help patients.

But the constraints within which those individuals operate — and the manner in which those constraints inhibit the delivery of patient care — are not unique. Rather, they are pervasive throughout America’s medical system. I know this, in part, because I’ve been researching that system. In many of the same ways that an undue emphasis on short-term metrics has become a central contributor to the legal profession’s most unfortunate trends (as I describe at length in The Lawyer Bubble – A Profession in Crisis), similar short-termism infects the medical profession, too.

Stated simply, behavior follows incentive structures. If you sense problems with what happens as I make my way through the very top tier of our medical system at one of the finest facilities in the world, remember that those problems are endemic. That’s a good reason to consider them carefully.

My first hospital admission ever happened on January 28, 2015. Everyone assumed that I had a lower GI bleed. For that, you get a colonoscopy, locate the bleed, and cauterize it. In my case, they didn’t find any bleed. So they did an endoscopy, too. Again, no sign of a source of the bleeding.

All of that was okay. Often, tiny blood vessels in the bowel seal themselves. One other noteworthy item would become important later: during the preparation process for the colonoscopy — and there’s definitely no reason to go into details about that — my hemoglobin level (a proxy for the volume of blood in the body) dropped dramatically. I required an infusion of two units of blood.

Three nights after walking into the ER, I went home. Things returned to normal for a few days as I watched the Super Bowl in my living room. On the following Tuesday and Thursday, I taught my undergraduate course. But by the end of my Thursday class, I was noticeably fatigued, again.

By Saturday morning, I decided on another trip to the ER to check my blood levels. I contacted my PCP; he agreed. I also contacted the GI physician who had done my colonoscopy. His “Fellow” — a kind of junior specialist in her late 20s or early 30s — returned my call and said she’d meet me in the ER. Blood tests revealed that the GI bleed persisted.

Meanwhile, my PCP remained active in his efforts to monitor my situation. But the days of his involvement in my care were numbered. To be sure, specialists with expertise in diagnosing and treating problems like mine are vital. It’s appropriate for PCP’s to defer to them. But once you’re in the hospital, the PCP has little or no influence over what happens to you.

The resulting lack of continuity in medical care would become a central theme of my hospital experiences. Anyone who does not actively manage whatever doctors in a hospital want to do — and fails to make sure that the physicians at the top of the food chain are intimately involved in diagnostic and treatment decisions — risks poor outcomes.

The attending ER physician said my low blood levels required hospital admission. Later, the GI Fellow saw me in the ER. After asking questions about symptoms, she voiced her conclusion:

“We’ll give you another colonoscopy.”

Confirmation bias had clouded her judgment. She had locked into a particular version of what was happening to me. I watched her recharacterize my description of symptoms — which suggested an upper GI bleed — to fit her minds’s model of a lower GI bleed.

Aware that the colonoscopy preparation process had caused my blood levels to crash during my previous hospital stay, I was pretty sure that another such procedure would not solve my problems. But now was not the time or place to start that discussion. The GI Fellow would be unwilling to hear whatever I had to say on the subject anyway.

On a gurney, I returned to the same inpatient floor that I had left a week earlier. Except for a third-year medical student, there would be no continuity in my care there.

WE INTERRUPT THIS BLOG…

Men make plans; God laughs.

This post isn’t about law schools, big law firms, or even the legal profession. Rather, it begins a new series that will end — well, I’m not sure when it will end — but I have a pretty good idea how it will end. A few days ago, I received an unfortunate diagnosis: pancreatic cancer.

For my entire life, I’ve been a healthy person. Never overweight (5’6″, 140-145 lbs.); never smoked; one or two glasses of wine per week; annual physical exams; regular exercise regimen for the past 20 years. The diagnosis is the culmination of a startling turn of events that began shortly after my January 24 keynote address at the DuPage County Bar Association’s Annual Mega-Meeting. The following day, I was still tired. Ten minutes into my usual 30-minute workout on my elliptical trainer, I was totally out of gas. For the remainder of the day, I rested.

On Monday, I felt better as I prepared for my Tuesday morning undergraduate course –  “American Lawyers – Demystifying the Profession” – at Northwestern University’s undergraduate campus in Evanston. The next day, I made it through the 90-minute session, but fatigue persisted.

By Wednesday morning, I felt bad enough to contact my doctor (“primary care physician” or “PCP”. We’ll be taking a deeper look into medical system as I proceed, so defined terms will become important). I told him that I had a major appearance scheduled for Friday in San Francisco. After describing my symptoms (including bowel movements that were, shall we say, indicative of a potential problem), he suggested blood tests.

I drove to downtown Chicago and began the half-mile walk from the Millennium Park garage to his office. One block into the trek, I knew I was in trouble — light-headed, weak, unsteady. (If I had disclosed my condition to my wife, she would have driven me. But I’m a do-it-yourself kind of guy.) I made it to the doctor’s waiting room, provided enough blood to perform complete tests, and then, after sitting for several minutes back in the lobby as I regained strength, walked back to my car.

Once home, I packed for San Francisco. My wife and I were looking forward to the brief trip involving my USF symposium appearance and a visit with our daughter living in the Bay Area.

At 4:30 pm on Wednesday, January 28, the phone rang. At the other end of the line was my doctor.

“You have to cancel your trip,” he said. “The only place you’re going is to the emergency room. I just received your blood tests.”

My life would never be the same.

ASIA: ONE FIRM GOES BIG WHILE ANOTHER GOES HOME

The contrasting headlines are striking. Two days after Fried Frank announced that it was pulling out of Asia, Dentons revealed that its partners had voted to jump in — big time. A week later, a ceremony that looked like a treaty-signing marked the combination of Dentons with Asia’s largest law firm, Dacheng Law Offices. The result is now a 6,600-lawyer behemoth.

A Big Bet

Dacheng and Dentons share some things in common. Both firms are themselves products of rapid inorganic growth. Dacheng was founded in 1992. Its website now boasts more than 4,000 lawyers worldwide.

Dentons resulted from transactions that combined four law firms — Sonnenschein, Nath & Rosenthal, Denton Wilde Sapte (UK), Salans (France), and Fraser Milner Casgrain (Canada) — into an organizational form known as a Swiss verein. Each firm maintains its own profit pool but shares strategy, branding, IT and other core functions. According to its website at the time of the Dacheng deal, 2,600 lawyers carried the “Dentons” brand.

But a brand is not a business, and any brand is only as good as its underlying product. Law firms have a single product to sell: the talent of their personnel. The most important challenge that comes with inorganic growth is maintaining consistent quality. In that regard and perhaps more than any other business, law firms have precious little margin for error.

In responding to anticipated questions on that subject, Dentons global CEO Elliott Portnoy framed the issue, but never really responded to it: “We know our competition will suggest that this dilutes profitability and will raise questions about quality control. But the simple truth is that we’re going to be able to generate more revenue, increase our profitability and position ourselves as a truly multicultural firm.”

The Big Question

Apart from failing to address the quality question, sound bites about multiculturalism don’t answer a central question: What will the culture of the combined organization become?

The practical differences between Dentons and Dacheng are enormous. According to The American Lawyer, average revenue per Dacheng lawyer is $78,000. In the October 2014 America  Lawyer Global 100 listing, Dentons’ RPL was $505,000. Even with separate revenue and profits pools, integrating these two giants will still be something to behold.

For example, the leadership structure of the new entity reads like the fine print on securities filing. The American Lawyer reports:

“The combined firm will also have a Chinese chair, and none of the five vereins will have a majority of board seats. Any single verein can also block a policy it doesn’t agree with. In the combined firm, the global board will be increased from 15 to 19, with five seats for the Chinese verein and the same number for the U.S. verein. Andrew says the future number of Chinese seats will be adjusted according to the verein’s revenue growth. The chair of the global board, which includes all five vereins, will be Peng; Portnoy will remain the firm’s global CEO, and Andrew will continue to be the firm’s outward face as global chair of the combined firm.”

The Big Risk

The principal question that any leader embarking on a merger of equals should ask is: What happens if it fails? Among other things, leadership requires risk management. Anticipating worst-case scenarios might lead to decisions that outsiders view as too conservative. But the downside consequence of failing to consider those scenarios can be fatal. Just ask the former partners of Dewey & LeBoeuf.

In that respect, the nearly simultaneous decision of Fried Frank to exit Asia after a nearly decade-long effort to gain traction there is interesting. That firm’s China entry began in 2006 with lateral hires from Hong Kong. A year later, it opened an office in Shanghai. But it began deliberating the fate of its Asia presence in 2009 before reaching its recent decision to leave.

According to firm chairman David Greenwald “discipline and good business judgment” led the firm to close its China offices. He deserves credit for a tough decision and forceful action. Calling the time of death on any failed effort is never easy.

In commenting to the American Lawyer about Fried Frank’s departure, law firm consultant Peter Zeughauser said, ““Nobody wants to admit defeat, but Fried Frank might be the canary in the mineshaft. China has always been a hard market, and with the local firms getting much stronger and starting to capture the lion’s share, it’s not getting any easier. Some firms will view it as a necessary investment for the future, but for others, it’s just not worth it.”

Different Approaches; Different Outcomes?

Published reports suggest that Fried Frank initially went into China hoping to capitalize on its existing relationships with U.S. clients — including Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch. Dentons appears to have a dramatically different strategy: joining forces with the largest of the China-based firms that Zeughauser identified as getting stronger.

Whatever else happens, the leaders of Dacheng-Dentons can say that they once presided over the largest ever lawyer branding experiment. Especially for Dentons, it involves a big bet. For the sake of everyone involved, let’s hope it’s on the right horse.